Presented by: Ashwin (Microsoft Azure MVP)
AndroidOS/MalLocker.B is a variant of a ransomware family targeting Android devices. It prevents the user from interacting with the UI by displaying a screen containing a ransom note over all other windows.
Source:
MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise
Now, let's see the details around the series of events associated with this software in chronological order, and how we can work to mitigate or detect these threats.
AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has registered to receive 14 different broadcast intents for automatically triggering malware payloads.
Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities.
An intent is a message passed between Android applications or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received.
In addition to Android system intents, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications.
In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.
Use Recent OS Version
Android 8 introduced additional limitations on the implicit intents that an application can register for.
Application vetting services can detect which broadcast intents an application registers for and which permissions it requests.
AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has employed both name mangling and meaningless variable names in source. AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has stored encrypted payload code in the Assets directory, coupled with a custom decryption routine that assembles a .dex file by passing data through Android Intent objects.
Adversaries may attempt to make a payload or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the device or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plaintext strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled.
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
Dynamic analysis, when used in application vetting, may in some cases be able to identify malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form by detecting the code at execution time (after it is deobfuscated or decrypted). Some application vetting techniques apply reputation analysis of the application developer and can alert to potentially suspicious applications without actual examination of application code.
AndroidOS/MalLocker.B can prevent the user from interacting with the UI by using a carefully crafted "call" notification screen. This is coupled with overriding the onUserLeaveHint() callback method to spawn a new notification instance when the current one is dismissed.
An adversary may seek to inhibit user interaction by locking the legitimate user out of the device. This is typically accomplished by requesting device administrator permissions and then locking the screen using DevicePolicyManager.lockNow(). Other novel techniques for locking the user out of the device have been observed, such as showing a persistent overlay, using carefully crafted "call" notification screens, and locking HTML pages in the foreground. These techniques can be very difficult to get around, and typically require booting the device into safe mode to uninstall the malware.
Prior to Android 7, device administrators were able to reset the device lock passcode to prevent the user from unlocking the device. The release of Android 7 introduced updates that only allow device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) to reset the device’s passcode.
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Recent versions of Android modified how device administrator applications are uninstalled, making it easier for the user to remove them. Android 7 introduced updates that revoke standard device administrators’ ability to reset the device’s passcode.
Users can view a list of device administrators in device settings and revoke permission where appropriate. Applications that request device administrator permissions should be scrutinized further for malicious behavior.
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