Understanding Attacks Linked to
APT30

Presented by: Ashwin (Microsoft Azure MVP)

APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.

Source:

MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise


Now, let's see the details around the series of events associated with this group in chronological order, and how we can work to mitigate or detect these threats.

Phishing

Initial Access

Spearphishing Attachment

APT30 has used spearphishing emails with malicious DOC attachments.

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.

Antivirus/Antimalware

Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.

Network Intrusion Prevention

Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity.

Restrict Web-Based Content

Block unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments.

Software Configuration

Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross domain) to perform similar message filtering and validation.

User Training

Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails.

Monitoring the following activities in your Organization can help you detect this technique.

Application Log: Application Log Content

Logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by third-party services (ex: metrics, errors, and/or alerts from mail/web applications)

Monitor for third-party application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.

File: File Creation

Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)

Monitor for newly constructed files from a spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems.

Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content

Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)

Monitor and analyze SSL/TLS traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.

Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow

Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)

Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.

User Execution

Execution

Malicious File

APT30 has relied on users to execute malicious file attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.

Adversaries may employ various forms of Masquerading and Obfuscated Files or Information to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.

While Malicious File frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

On Windows 10, various Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules can be enabled to prevent the execution of potentially malicious executable files (such as those that have been downloaded and executed by Office applications/scripting interpreters/email clients or that do not meet specific prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria). Note: cloud-delivered protection must be enabled for certain rules. 

Execution Prevention

Application control may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.

User Training

Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events.

Monitoring the following activities in your Organization can help you detect this technique.

File: File Creation

Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)

Monitor for newly constructed files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).

Process: Process Creation

Birth of a new running process (ex: Sysmon EID 1 or Windows EID 4688)

Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads.